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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Detective Sergeant Naomi Joseph of the Virgin Islands 
Police Department applied for a warrant to search Tydel 
John’s home for child pornography, relying solely on an 
affidavit that established only probable cause to believe that 
she would find evidence that he had sexually assaulted 
several children at the school where he taught.  In her 
affidavit, Joseph did not allege any direct evidence that John 
possessed child pornography, did not aver the existence of 
any connection between the two crimes, and did not claim 
either a good faith belief in such a connection or any basis for 
thinking that one had been established.  In general, the 
affidavit provided no reason to believe that a person who has 
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committed child sexual assault would be likely to possess 
child pornography.  Despite these deficiencies, a Virgin 
Islands Superior Court judge issued the warrant, and Joseph’s 
search turned up incriminating documents (but no child 
pornography).  We granted certiorari to determine whether 
this evidence was properly suppressed. 
I 
 On November 27, 2007, following a presentation by 
the Virgin Islands Domestic Violence Sexual Assault 
Council, several of John’s sixth-grade students told school 
officials that John had touched them inappropriately.  The 
school passed this information on to the police, and Joseph 
was tasked with investigating.  She began by interviewing the 
complaining witnesses, several of whom accused John of 
sexually assaulting them in his classroom.  The girls also 
advised Joseph that John maintained two spiral notebooks, 
one blue and one red, in which he routinely “ma[de] notations 
. . . regarding his students.”  One student reported that John 
had written “inappropriate things about the female students of 
his current class and previous classes” in the blue notebook.  
According to the witnesses, John carried the notebooks with 
him to and from school each day in his work bag. 
 With this information in hand, Joseph sought a warrant 
authorizing her to search John’s home.  Joseph’s affidavit set 
forth the above facts in somewhat more detail, and averred 
that “persons who commit sexual offense crimes involving 
children customarily hide evidence of such offenses, 
including notes, photographs, [and] computer files, in their 
homes and on their computer[s].”  In addition to the red and 
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blue notebooks, the warrant application sought permission to 
collect from John’s home pornographic magazines, 
pornographic photographs of children, and computer files 
containing pornographic notes and photographs of children.  
A Virgin Islands Superior Court judge issued the warrant, as 
requested, on December 3, 2007, and Joseph led the law 
enforcement team that executed it shortly thereafter. 
According to Joseph’s testimony at John’s suppression 
hearing, it was “[r]elatively early in the search” that the 
officers located a black bag containing the red and blue spiral 
notebooks mentioned in the affidavit.  Joseph allowed the 
search to continue, because she was still “[l]ooking for any 
pornographic photos of children.” The officers under her 
charge found no such photos, but they nevertheless carted 
away several computers and ten black and white composition-
book-style journals, in addition to the two spiral notebooks 
that the witnesses had identified.  The journals (labeled 
“Tydel John Journals,” with dates) were retrieved from John’s 
bedroom closet and a bookshelf, and did not resemble the 
spiral notebooks—which had already been seized by the time 
the journals were found.   
While there is nothing in the “Tydel John Journals” 
that would constitute child pornography, they do contain 
evidence germane to the charges of aggravated rape, unlawful 
sexual contact, child abuse, and child neglect that John now 
faces.  He therefore moved to exclude them from trial, 
arguing that Joseph’s search warrant was invalid and that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment.  The Superior Court 
granted the motion, and the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands affirmed in a per curiam opinion.  52 V.I. 247 (2009).  
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The Court held that the search for child pornography was not 
supported by probable cause, id. at 256, and that any search 
of the home that occurred after the blue and red spiral 
notebooks had been found was thus beyond the permissible 
scope of the warrant’s execution, id. at 260. It then addressed 
the so-called “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, 
observing that the exception does not apply in the case of a 
warrant obtained on the basis of an affidavit that is “so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 261 (quoting 
United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  Because an examination of Joseph’s affidavit 
revealed “not a single assertion that John was in any way 
associated with child pornography,” the court concluded that 
“the officers executing the warrant blindly relied on the fact 
that the warrant was issued by a judge and disregarded the 
fact that their search was not supported by probable cause.”  
Id. at 262.  In the view of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, 
such “blind reliance” on a warrant issued in the complete 
absence of probable cause “can and should be deterred by 
excluding the fruits of the illegal search, and the deterrent 
effect of suppression is substantial enough to outweigh any 
harm to the justice system.”  Id. at 263.  The “good faith” 
exception therefore did not save the evidence from 
suppression.  Id. 
A panel of this court granted the Virgin Islands’ 
petition for a writ of certiorari, “limited to the question 
whether the decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands is inconsistent with Herring v. United States, 129 S. 
Ct. 695 (2009), in its application of the good faith exception 
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to the exclusionary rule.”  Our order also directed the parties 
“to explain in their briefing the basis, if any, upon which this 
Court has certiorari jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands as a ‘final decision’ 
within the meaning of 48 U.S.C. § 1613.” 
II 
 We first address the jurisdictional question 
propounded in our order granting certiorari, beginning with 
the text of the relevant statute.  Section 1613 defines the 
relations between the courts of the United States and the 
courts of the Virgin Islands.  It provides that, for the time 
being, “the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari 
all final decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands 
from which a decision could be had.”  The same section 
elsewhere states: 
The relations between the courts established by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States 
and the courts established by [Virgin Islands] 
law with respect to appeals, certiorari, removal 
of causes, the issuance of writs of habeas 
corpus, and other matters or proceedings shall 
be governed by the laws of the United States 
pertaining to the relations between the courts of 
the United States, including the Supreme Court 
of the United States, and the courts of the 
several States in such matters and proceedings. 
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Reading these sentences together, it is plain that Congress 
intended for this court’s certiorari jurisdiction vis-à-vis the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court to mirror the United States 
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction vis-à-vis any of the 
fifty state courts of last resort.  We can therefore review by 
certiorari a decision of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court if 
that decision is “final” within the meaning of the United 
States Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1257.   
 A ruling on a suppression motion is interlocutory in 
nature, and therefore does not obviously qualify as a “final 
decision.”  See Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131 
(1962).  The federal Supreme Court has nevertheless held that 
an order granting such a motion is reviewable: 
Although respondent has yet to be tried in state 
court, the suppression ruling challenged herein 
is a “final judgment” within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1257(3), and we have jurisdiction over 
this case. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975), we identified four 
categories of cases where the Court will treat a 
decision of the highest state court as final for § 
1257 purposes even though further proceedings 
are anticipated in the lower state courts. This 
case . . . falls within the category which 
includes “those situations where the federal 
claim has been finally decided . . . but in which 
later review of the federal issue cannot be had, 
whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.” 420 
U.S., at 481. In this case should the State 
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convict respondent at trial, its claim that certain 
evidence was wrongfully suppressed will be 
moot. Should respondent be acquitted at trial, 
the State will be precluded from pressing its 
federal claim again on appeal. 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 n.1 (1984).  This 
logic is directly applicable here.  The Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court has “finally decided” John’s federal constitutional 
claim, and re-examination of its decision on a later appeal 
will prove impossible:  A conviction would moot the issue, 
and an acquittal would preclude the prosecution from 
rearguing the point on appeal.  See id.; United States v. 
Carrillo-Bernal, 58 F.3d 1490, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(detailing the historical development of the rule against 
government appeals of not-guilty verdicts); Gov’t of the 
Virgin Islands v. Christensen, 673 F.2d 713, 715 (3d Cir. 
1982) (collecting cases).  The Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
decision is therefore “final” for purposes of certiorari 
jurisdiction, and § 1613 gives us authority to review it. 
The parties have raised the possibility that 18 U.S.C. § 
3731 also serves as a basis for our jurisdiction.  That section 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n appeal by the United 
States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order 
of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence . . . , not 
made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy.”  We treat 
the Government of the Virgin Islands as a prosecutorial arm 
of the federal government, so § 3731 permits it to take certain 
interlocutory appeals.  Christensen, 673 F.3d at 716.  Until 
2004, the Appellate Division of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands heard appeals from the Virgin Islands Superior 
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Court; the Appellate Division’s decisions were then 
appealable to this court.  See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. 
Rivera, 333 F.3d 143, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2003).    Because the 
Appellate Division was part of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, appeals from its decisions were treated “no 
differently than appeals taken from any other federal district 
court.”1  Id. at 146.  Thus, in Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. 
Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 574 (3d Cir. 1994), we concluded 
that § 3731 gave us jurisdiction over appeals from the 
Appellate Division filed by the Government of the Virgin 
Islands.   
The Government argues that the establishment of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court does not change anything.  In 
its view, § 3731 gives us jurisdiction over interlocutory 
criminal appeals from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court filed 
by the Government, just as it gave us jurisdiction over the 
same appeals from the Appellate Division.  This position is 
inconsistent with the text of § 3731, which refers to “an 
appeal” from a “district court.”  With the change in the 
organization of the Virgin Islands courts, the case we are 
today asked to decide comes from the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court—which is not part of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands or any other “district court.”  Just as importantly, our 
authority to re-examine decisions of the courts of the Virgin 
Islands (as distinct from the federally established courts with 
 
1 The statute creating the Appellate Division was repealed 
when the Virgin Islands created the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  
The Appellate Division will cease to exist when the last case 
pending on its docket is decided.  See Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 
497 F.3d 355, 359 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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jurisdiction over that territory) is limited to “review by writ of 
certiorari [of] all final decisions of the highest court of the 
Virgin Islands from which a decision could be had.”  48 
U.S.C. § 1613 (emphasis added).  Issuance of a writ of 
certiorari and the “appeal” contemplated by § 3731 are 
discrete forms of review: the former is discretionary in nature, 
while the latter is generally available to a losing litigant as of 
right.  Our review of Virgin Islands Supreme Court cases by 
certiorari is meant to permit correction of important errors 
while preserving the territorial courts’ ability to develop local 
law and institutional traditions, in advance of the eventual 
goal of allowing direct United States Supreme Court 
certiorari review (eliminating entirely any review by this 
court).  See Pichardo v. Virgin Islands Comm’r of Labor, 613 
F.3d 87, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010); 48 U.S.C. § 1613.  Allowing 
as-of-right appeals in a certain class of cases under § 3731 
would obstruct this aim by hindering the development of 
Virgin-Islands-specific case law and undercutting the 
authority of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  We therefore 
review its decisions at our discretion rather than as a matter of 
course: that is, by writ of certiorari rather than on appeal.   
Because this is not an “appeal” and does not come to 
us from a “district court,” § 3731 cannot apply.  Section 1613 
is the sole source of our authority to decide this case. 
III 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court’s ruling is inconsistent with Herring v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009), in which the Supreme 
Court addressed the “good faith” exception to the 
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exclusionary rule that it had previously established in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  Because “the 
exclusionary rule is not an individual right,” but is instead a 
means of deterring Fourth Amendment violations, it “applies 
only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”  Herring, 
129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909).  
Suppression of valuable evidence imposes social costs by 
hindering the courts’ truth-seeking function, but the Supreme 
Court has determined that those costs are outweighed by the 
need to prevent illegal and culpable law enforcement conduct.  
But because some unconstitutional conduct is unlikely to be 
deterred by the threat of sanctions, exclusion is not a blanket 
remedy.  Where, for instance, a reasonable officer cannot 
have been expected to know that what he was doing was 
unconstitutional, he is unlikely to be discouraged in his 
actions by the knowledge that the fruits of unconstitutional 
searches will be suppressed.  There is no sense in suppressing 
whatever evidence he may have uncovered in such a case, for 
the limited or nonexistent deterrent value of exclusion does 
not outweigh the cost.  See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. --
-, slip op. at 6–9 (2011).  Accordingly, “[t]o trigger the 
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.”  Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
The Leon rule is a specific application of this general 
principle.  As Herring described it, Leon holds that “[w]hen 
police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable 
cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted 
‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently 
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invalidated search warrant.”  Id. at 701 (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922).  A warrant represents judicial authorization of a 
particular search or seizure, and it is thought that exclusion 
will not deter police from relying on an invalid warrant unless 
the police should reasonably have known that the warrant’s 
issuance would be found unconstitutional.  We have 
identified “four limited circumstances” in which a police 
officer’s reliance on a warrant will not be considered 
“objectively reasonable”: 
1) where the magistrate judge issued the warrant in 
reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false 
affidavit; 
2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his or 
her judicial role and failed to perform his or her 
neutral and detached function; 
3)  where the warrant was based on an affidavit so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; or 
4)  where the warrant was so facially deficient that 
it failed to particularize the place to be searched 
or the things to be seized. 
United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (2010) (citing 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 436–37).  “These limited exceptions 
are consistent with the approach taken in Herring because 
each of these circumstances involve[s] conduct that is 
‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,’ and thus the 
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benefits of deterring future misconduct ‘outweigh the costs’ 
of excluding the evidence.”  Id. (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. 
at 700, 702).   
John invokes the third of these exceptions to the Leon-
Herring rule, arguing that Joseph’s affidavit was “so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.”2  Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151.  
 
2 John concedes that the warrant was valid insofar as it 
authorized a search for the red and blue spiral notebooks that had 
been specifically identified as containing evidence of his alleged 
crimes.  He seeks only to suppress the journals, which were found 
after the search’s admittedly legal objects had been seized. 
The panel is in agreement that Joseph’s affidavit did not 
provide probable cause to believe that any evidence or contraband 
other than the red and blue notebooks would be found in John’s 
house.  See infra, at 14–15; post, at 3, 5, 6–7.  Generally, “where 
the evidence authorized to be seized exceeds the underlying 
probable cause justification, the proper course is for the court to 
redact that information from the affidavit of probable cause.” 
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 389 (3d Cir. 2006).  In this 
context, “redaction” means: 
 
[S]triking from a warrant those severable phrases 
and clauses that are invalid for lack of probable 
cause or generality and preserving those severable 
phrases and clauses that satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment. Each part of the search authorized by 
the warrant is examined separately to determine 
whether it is impermissibly general or unsupported 
by probable cause. Materials seized under the 
authority of those parts of the warrant struck for 
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We agree, because the catalogue of the affidavit’s “indicia of 
probable cause” with respect to child pornography is 
completely empty.  The Virgin Islands Supreme Court was 
correct in describing the affidavit as “wholly lacking in 
probable cause,” because “[e]ven a cursory reading of Officer 
Joseph’s affidavit reveals that there is not a single assertion 
that John was in any way associated with child pornography.”  
52 V.I. at 263, 262.  To be sure, the affidavit provides reason 
to believe that John had committed sex crimes against his 
students on school property, and that he kept two particular 
pieces of evidence of those crimes in his home.  But those 
allegations are not sufficient to establish—or even to hint at—
probable cause as to the wholly separate crime of possessing 
child pornography.   
A belief in the existence of probable cause in this case 
requires believing that a person who has sexually assaulted a 
child is also likely to collect child pornography.  Putting aside 
for the moment the reasonableness of such an assumed 
connection, that latter belief is not stated anywhere in 
 
invalidity must be suppressed, but the court need 
not suppress materials seized pursuant to the valid 
portions of the warrant. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 
1982)).  Because there was no probable cause to justify continuing 
to search John’s home for child pornography once the two 
specifically identified notebooks had been discovered, all evidence 
seized after that point—including the journals that are the subject 
of this appeal—is subject to suppression unless some exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies. 
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Joseph’s affidavit.  The closest the affidavit comes is the 
averment that “persons who commit sexual offense crimes 
involving children customarily hide evidence of such 
offenses, including notes, photographs, [and] computer files, 
in their homes and on their computer[s].”  But all this 
statement can be read to allege is that John, who stands 
accused of sexually abusing children, “customarily hide[s]” 
evidence of that crime in his home and/or on his computer.  It 
does not allege that an individual in John’s position also 
“customarily hide[s]” evidence of other crimes, in his home 
or anywhere else.  Without such an allegation, it was 
unreasonable to conclude that there was probable cause to 
believe that John possessed child pornography.   
It should be clear that the existence of an assault-
pornography correlation is a question of fact that Joseph was 
required to allege (and to support with averments stating the 
basis for the allegation) if she desired to rely on it as the basis 
for a probable cause determination.  It is not a legal issue to 
be entrusted to a magistrate’s judgment as a matter of abstract 
doctrine.  Either a correlation exists between the conduct 
underlying one crime and the conduct underlying another, or 
it does not.  Forming a belief regarding the answer to that 
question does not involve interpreting a statute, or analyzing a 
Supreme Court decision, or applying some common law 
doctrine.  Because the question is one that can be resolved 
only through the evaluation of evidence, it must be alleged on 
the face of the affidavit in order to be considered for purposes 
of determining probable cause. 
As the Second Circuit wrote in a case quite similar to 
our own, “‘[i]t is an inferential fallacy of ancient standing to 
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conclude that, because members of group A’ (those who 
collect child pornography) ‘are likely to be members of group 
B’ (those attracted to children), ‘then group B is entirely, or 
even largely composed of, members of group A.’”  United 
States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(Pooler, J., dissenting)).  Then-Judge Sotomayor went on: 
Although offenses relating to child pornography 
and sexual abuse of minors both involve the 
exploitation of children, that does not compel, 
or even suggest, the correlation [that a person 
who has committed one crime has likely 
committed the other] drawn by the district 
court. Perhaps it is true that all or most people 
who are attracted to minors collect child 
pornography. But that association is nowhere 
stated or supported in the affidavit. See [Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)] (probable 
cause assessments are to be made from “all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit”); 
[United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1067 
(9th Cir. 2006)] (“All data necessary to show 
probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant must be contained within the four 
corners of a written affidavit given under oath” 
(internal marks and citation omitted)). . . .  [A]n 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right cannot be 
vitiated based on fallacious inferences drawn 
from facts not supported by the affidavit. 
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Id. (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, in United States v. 
Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008), the Sixth Circuit 
held that it was “entirely unreasonable” for Leon purposes 
“for the officer executing the warrant either to infer that 
nexus [between child molestation and possession of child 
pornography] herself or to rely on her own subjective 
knowledge [of the existence of such a nexus] to claim 
reasonable reliance on the warrant.”   
Just so in this case.  We acknowledge the possibility 
that studies might show that a correlation exists between one 
crime and the other; or perhaps extensive investigatory 
experience might reveal a pattern substantial enough to 
support a reasonable belief on the part of a police detective.  
But Joseph’s affidavit did not allege the existence of the 
connection in question, let alone any evidentiary reason to 
believe in it.  She should not, therefore, be permitted either to 
draw an inference from facts not stated in the affidavit or to 
rely on her own personal knowledge.  She was instead 
required to state all the relevant facts in the warrant affidavit 
and submit them to judicial scrutiny.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Olvey, 437 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Where there is no 
evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge, the probable 
cause determination must be based upon only that 
information which is found within the four corners of the 
affidavit.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);  
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 431 n.3 (“We, of course, must 
confine ourselves to the facts that were before the issuing 
magistrate—in other words, the affidavit.”). 
18 
 
Requiring that a warrant applicant state explicitly her 
belief in the existence of a correlation like the one on which 
Joseph apparently relied, as well as reasons justifying such a 
belief, is not inconsistent with the fact that these affidavits are 
typically drawn by laypersons rather than attorneys.  Even 
police officers who lack legal training are expected to know 
of the requirement that the factual basis for a probable cause 
determination must be stated in the affidavit.  We demand 
nothing more than that an officer seeking a warrant explain 
why she is justified in entering a person’s home and searching 
through his belongings.  This insistence that law enforcement 
comply with a bedrock principle of the Fourth Amendment 
cannot be dismissed as the imposition of an unnecessary or 
hypertechnical obligation. 
Policing this requirement easily passes the cost-benefit 
analysis set forth in Herring.  Reliance on a warrant affidavit 
that omits a fact critical to any reasonable belief in the 
existence of probable cause is the sort of thing we can expect 
the exclusionary rule to deter: all an investigator must do to 
avoid exclusion is comply with the well-known duty to spell 
out the complete factual basis for a finding of probable cause 
within the affidavit’s four corners.  And deterring police from 
submitting (and magistrates from accepting) affidavits that 
completely omit crucial factual allegations is a preeminently 
worthy goal.  Reckless or grossly negligent conduct is enough 
to justify suppression, and Leon and its progeny establish that 
an officer’s conduct is sufficiently deliberate and culpable 
when she relies on a warrant that is as devoid of probable 
cause as this one.  See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702; Tracey, 597 
F.3d at 151.  Joseph’s reliance on the warrant was “entirely 
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unreasonable,” Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151; her behavior was, at 
a minimum, grossly negligent.  Moreover, applying Leon in 
cases like the one at bar would risk encouraging police to 
seek permission to search for evidence of crimes unrelated to 
any known facts, based upon nothing more than unstated and 
unsupported hunches.  It would reward law enforcement for 
grounding warrant applications in unexamined biases and 
stereotypes rather than in conscientious assessment of the 
facts and circumstances uncovered by the investigation.  Leon 
and its progeny were never intended to ratify such unjustified 
intrusions into the privacy safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment.  The “good faith” exception does not shield 
Joseph’s actions here.  The evidence obtained pursuant to the 
invalid portion of the warrant (i.e., the portion authorizing a 
search for child pornography) must be suppressed. 
We are not persuaded by the cases that may be cited in 
support of the contrary conclusion.  The prosecution relies on 
United States v. Haynes, 160 F. App’x. 940 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam) (unpublished), but that decision did not actually 
decide the question whether probable cause or sufficient 
indicia thereof existed.  Haynes conceded that the warrant to 
search his home was valid insofar as it pertained to evidence 
of enticing a minor to engage in sexual conduct, but argued 
that the police lacked probable cause to believe he possessed 
child pornography.  He did not, however, mount an argument 
on appeal that any of the exceptions to the Leon doctrine 
applied.  The court therefore had no need to engage in serious 
analysis of the question whether the executing officers had 
acted in reasonable reliance on the warrant (though it noted 
offhandedly that they “clearly” had).  See id. at 944.  
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Moreover, the opinion leaves unclear whether the court was 
even faced with the question we address today, because it 
does not relate whether the warrant affidavit contained an 
averment purporting to link the suspected crime of child 
enticement to the search for child pornography.  Haynes has 
no bearing on this case. 
 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), carries more force than 
Haynes, but is distinct from the case now before us.  A 
witness called police after observing Colbert pushing a five-
year-old girl (whom he did not know) on a playground 
swingset while talking to her “about movies and videos the 
man had at his home.” Upon stopping Colbert’s car and 
conducting a consensual search, police found a police 
scanner, handcuffs, and a “New York PD” hat.  The 
defendant also admitted speaking to the girl about movies that 
he kept at his apartment.  Id. at 575.  On this basis the police 
obtained a warrant to search Colbert’s apartment for child 
pornography, which they recovered and which Colbert moved 
to suppress.   See id. at 575–76. 
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled that the 
warrant was supported by probable cause. The majority 
argued that a tendency to sexually abuse or exploit children is 
relevant to the analysis of whether probable cause exists to 
search for child pornography, asserting that “[t]here is an 
intuitive relationship between acts such as child molestation 
or enticement and possession of child pornography.”  Id.  A 
suspected proclivity for child molestation was therefore a 
factor that the magistrate could properly consider in making 
his probable cause determination.  Crucially for our purposes, 
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however, the court did not simply rely on the defendant’s 
inappropriate interest in the little girl, but instead considered 
it as one of several factors in its probable cause analysis.  The 
defendant had attempted to take the child home to watch 
movies with him, and according to the court  
it would strain credulity to believe that Colbert 
was attempting to lure the child there to watch, 
say, “Mary Poppins” or “The Sound of Music,” 
or to engage in basket weaving or a game of 
pickup sticks. The circumstances suggest that 
Colbert intended to victimize the child in some 
manner, and as the Supreme Court recognized 
nearly twenty years ago, “evidence suggests 
that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce 
other children into sexual activity.” 
Id. (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)). The 
implication is that combining the evidence of the defendant’s 
suspected pedophilia with his specific desire to watch movies 
at his home with an unrelated five-year-old girl provided 
probable cause for thinking that the movies to be watched 
were child pornography, intended for use in a seductive 
manner.  The specific reference to watching movies at the 
defendant’s home was crucial to the court’s totality-of-the-
circumstances assessment that probable cause was present.  
See id. at 577 (distinguishing Hodson and Falso on the basis 
that “[n]either case involved an application for a search 
warrant based on the defendant’s contemporaneous attempt to 
entice a child”).  Our case also does not involve a 
“contemporaneous attempt to entice a child,” and there is no 
suggestion that John had ever attempted to use child 
22 
 
pornography or other videos to ensnare his alleged victims.  
Because all of the alleged assaults took place at school, it 
makes no sense to suppose that he would have kept child 
pornography in his home to aid him in his criminal endeavor.  
And at all events, as we have noted, Joseph neither averred 
the existence of a connection between the two types of 
conduct nor alleged facts from which the Superior Court 
judge could reasonably have inferred that such a nexus 
existed. 
Furthermore, for reasons explained above, the Eighth 
Circuit’s assertion that there exists an “intuitive relationship” 
between two distinct crimes is suspect.  Notwithstanding its 
own precedent requiring courts to confine themselves to the 
“four corners of the affidavit,” Olvey, 437 F.3d at 807, the 
court found probable cause in an affidavit that provided 
neither evidence for nor an averment of the correlation in 
question.  We consider ourselves bound to refer only to the 
contents of Joseph’s submission to the Superior Court judge 
who issued the warrant, and (as we have explained) those 
contents cannot reasonably have been read to establish the 
requisite indicia of probable cause. 
IV 
It is settled law that a probable cause affidavit must set 
forth all the facts upon which the affiant seeks to rely in 
obtaining a warrant.  The affidavit in this case omitted the 
linchpin allegation on which any reasonable belief in the 
existence of probable cause must have depended.  Joseph 
therefore cannot be regarded as having acted in “good faith” 
within the meaning of Leon, and the Virgin Islands courts 
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were right to suppress the illegally-seized journals.  We will 
affirm their judgment. 
Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. John 
09-4185 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
In Davis v. United States, The Supreme Court made it 
clear that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
Fourth Amendment violations.  564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 6 
(2011).  We do not apply it to sanction errant magistrate 
judges.  Id. at 8.  Nor do we apply it when a police officer 
makes the same legal error as the judge who issued the 
warrant.  Rather, we apply the “extreme sanction of 
exclusion” only as a “last resort” to deter police conduct that 
is “deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent.”  United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 926 (1984); Davis, 564 U.S. ---, slip 
op. at 7, 8;  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 
(2009).  Here, the trial court made no finding that police 
officer Naomi Joseph acted deliberately, recklessly, or with 
gross negligence.  Thus, I see no support for the proposition 
that the Majority’s ruling will have a beneficial deterrent 
effect.  I respectfully dissent because excluding the evidence 
in this case imposes great costs and “offends basic concepts 
of the criminal justice system.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.1 
I. 
 Following a presentation to Tydel John’s sixth-grade 
class on the difference between appropriate and inappropriate 
touching, several students reported that John had engaged in 
inappropriate contact with them.  After interviewing some of 
the students, police officer Naomi Joseph submitted an 
affidavit and request for a warrant to search John’s home.  
The affidavit stated that “persons who commit sexual 
offenses involving children customarily hide evidence of such 
offenses, including notes, photographs, computer files, in 
their homes and on their computer.”  (J.A. 108, 182).  Based 
on this belief, Joseph concluded that she would find 
notebooks, pornographic photos of children and computer 
files containing pornographic notes or photographs of 
children.  A Superior Court Judge determined there was 
probable cause to believe evidence of sexual contact would be 
                                                 
1 I agree with my colleagues that we have jurisdiction over 
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613. 
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found in John’s home.  Ultimately, police searched John’s 
home and, while looking for evidence of child pornography, 
they  found notebooks containing chronicles of John’s 
exploitation of young girls. 
On John’s motion, a Virgin Islands superior court 
judge, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States 
v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008), held that because a 
warrant establishing probable cause for child molestation 
does not necessarily provide probable cause to search for 
child pornography, John’s notebooks must be suppressed.  I 
believe that the Majority decision affirming that suppression 
to be wrong under the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and contrary to the Supreme Court’s most 
recent pronouncement of that rule in Davis v. United States, 
564 U.S. ---slip op. at 8-9 (2011).  In short, “[b]ecause 
suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in 
these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost 
to both the truth and the public safety,” I respectfully dissent.  
Id. at 1. 
II. 
My disagreement with the Majority is not that a 
correlation between child abuse and child pornography was 
not properly established.  Indeed, there may be a nexus.  As 
then Circuit Judge Sotomayor, observed, “[p]erhaps it is true 
that all or most people who are attracted to minors collect 
child pornography.”  United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 
122 (2d Cir. 2008)(Sotomayor, J.).  And perhaps it is not.2  In 
                                                 
2 The literature is mixed.  Most of the studies are concerned 
with whether possession of child pornography causes the 
possessor to actually commit a sexual offense against a child.  
The reverse relationship—whether child molesters are more 
likely to possess child pornography—has been of less interest 
to scholars.  It is clear that the “empirical literature is unable 
to validate the assumption that there is a causal connection 
between possession of child pornography and child sex 
abuse.”  Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child 
Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
853, 875(2011).  But it is equally clear that the empirical data 
shows a high correlation between general pornography 
consumption and child molestation.  See Neil Malamuth & 
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this case, I agree that the judge who issued the warrant should 
have insisted on a more direct connection between child 
abuse and  child pornography.  But, in my view, the failure to 
allege the connection between the two does not support the 
Majority’s view that Officer Joseph was “grossly negligent” 
and that failure does not justify the extreme sanction of 
exclusion.   
The Supreme Court has articulated two principles that 
limit the application of the exclusionary rule.  The rule 
applies “only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence” 
and, even when it does, “the benefits of deterrence must 
outweigh the costs.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (citing Leon, 
468 U.S. at 909, 910) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Davis, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at  6.  There is likely to be 
no appreciable deterrence “when an officer acting with 
objective good faith has obtained a search warrant and acted 
within its scope” because “[i]n most such cases, there is no 
police illegality and thus nothing to deter.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
920-21.  On the other hand, when an officer exhibits 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth 
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong 
and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”  Davis, 564 U.S. --
-, slip op. at 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The Majority believes that its decision will have a 
deterrent effect because Joseph’s behavior was, “at a 
minimum, grossly negligent.”  (Maj. Op. at 16.)  This is a 
factual determination that is not supported by the record.  Cf. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978) (concluding 
that a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence at a factual hearing that an affiant knowingly, 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included 
a false statement in an affidavit).  Moreover, we are not in a 
position to make such a finding, depending as it does on 
assessments of credibility and demeanor that are not readily 
apparent in a transcript.  Absent such a finding, “the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force and exclusion 
                                                                                                             
Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child 
Pornography:  Bringing the Law in Line with the Research 
Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 773, 794 (2007) 
(“Overall, these data do indicate that child molesters have had 
more pornography exposure than other groups.”).  
3 
cannot pay its way.”  Davis, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 8 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The Majority further concludes that the warrant was 
“based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable,” and hence culpable enough to be deterred by 
applying the exclusionary rule.  (Maj. Op. at 11 (quoting 
United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
However, applicable precedent requires us to determine the 
culpability of a police officer’s conduct in an objective 
fashion, asking whether “a reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal in light of all 
the circumstances.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (quoting Leon, 
468 U.S. at 922 n.23).   
In this light, the question is what a reasonably well 
trained officer would have known when applying for a 
warrant in December 2007.  Such an officer would have 
known that probable cause exists when there is a “fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983), but little else.  In December 2007, there were no 
precedents applying this broad standard to analogous facts.  
Under such circumstances, a reasonable police officer would 
do exactly what Joseph did:  she would submit a request to a 
judge asking whether there is probable cause for a warrant.  
And, lacking legal training herself, she would then rely on 
that judicial determination to do her job.  One might argue 
that suppressing evidence obtained when a warrant is invalid 
would encourage police officers to scrutinize the warrant 
closely and point out legal errors.  But police officers are not 
lawyers and this argument was expressly rejected in Leon as 
“speculative.”  468 U.S. at 918. 
The reasonably well-trained officer would fare no 
better today.  While that officer would have the benefit of 
several court of appeals opinions discussing the issue of 
whether probable cause to believe that someone has molested 
a child automatically provides probable cause to believe that 
someone will possess photographic evidence of that crime (or 
photos used to facilitate the crime—tools of a despicable 
trade), those opinions provide conflicting guidance.  Compare 
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292, 293 (concluding that there is no 
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probable cause in such circumstances and applying the 
exclusionary rule), with Falso, 544 F.3d at 122, 125 
(concluding that there was no probable cause, but refusing to 
apply the exclusionary rule), and with United States v. 
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 576, 578-79 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that the relationship between child molestation 
and child pornography is “intuitive,” thus providing probable 
cause, and then holding in the alternative that the 
exclusionary rule would not apply).   
The split in the courts of appeals that have addressed 
this issue shows that even judges, steeped in the law and 
acting in the utmost good faith, can have different opinions on 
the issue.  If even the experts cannot agree on whether 
probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation 
provides probable cause to search for child pornography, it 
was not objectively unreasonable—let alone, entirely 
unreasonable—for Joseph to take one side of the controversy 
over the other, even if we now disagree with that decision.  
Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (noting divided opinion among 
judges as to the existence of probable cause in that case and 
then observing that under such circumstances “the officers’ 
reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause 
was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme 
sanction of exclusion is inappropriate”); see also Falso, 544 
F.3d at 128 (stating that this is an issue “upon which 
reasonable minds can differ” before concluding that police 
officers acted in good faith). 
Even the Second Circuit, which quite correctly found 
the supposed connection between child molestation and child 
pornography to be nothing more than an “inferential fallacy 
of ancient standing,” could not come to the conclusion that a 
police officer acting on a warrant based on such an 
assumption was entirely unreasonable.  See Falso, 544 F.3d at 
128 (“Once the district court rules on the legal sufficiency of 
the facts alleged in the affidavit, the officers were justified in 
executing the warrant.”).  It is not difficult to see why.  
Probable cause determinations are not, and never have been, 
based on rigid logic.  As the Supreme Court explained almost 
thirty years ago, evidence must be “seen and weighed not in 
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by 
those versed in the field of law enforcement. . . . [P]robable 
cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of 
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probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”  Gates, 
462 U.S. at 232.  It was not unreasonable for Joseph to assess 
the probability that John would have child pornography and 
conclude that there was probable cause. 
A comparison with the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Davis makes this clear.  In Davis, the Supreme 
Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule where the police 
followed a court of appeals precedent authorizing their search 
of an automobile because “[a]bout all that exclusion would 
deter in this case is conscientious police work.  Responsible 
law-enforcement officers will take care to learn ‘what is 
required of them’ under Fourth Amendment precedent and 
will conform their conduct to these rules.”  564 U.S. ---, slip 
op. at 11 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 
(2006)).  This case is the other side of the Davis coin.  Here, 
there was no legal precedent to guide a responsible law 
enforcement official’s judgment as to whether there was 
probable cause for a particular search.  As I’ve said, a 
responsible law enforcement official in this position does 
exactly what Joseph did and seeks a legal determination of 
probable cause from a judge.  The police officer then relies on 
this judicial determination authorizing her conduct as a tool to 
“fulfill [her] crime-detection and public-safety 
responsibilities.”  Id.  Applying the exclusionary rule in such 
circumstances would serve only to “discourage the officer 
from doing [her] duty,” which is “not the kind of deterrence 
the exclusionary rule seeks to foster.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
Joseph’s mistake was not the error of culpably 
omitting a crucial fact linking child molestation with child 
pornography.  Her mistake was in thinking that the facts she 
did provide—that “persons who commit sexual offense 
crimes involving children customarily hide evidence of such 
offenses, including notes, photographs, [and] computer files, 
in the homes and on their computer[s]”—were sufficient to 
establish probable cause to search for child pornography.  In 
other words, she believed there was a fair probability that a 
man accused of molesting children and recording his crimes 
in one medium—a written journal—might also record them in 
another—photographs.  Although we might now wish that she 
had provided more specific justifications for this belief, 
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Joseph’s conduct was not entirely unreasonable.  She made a 
mistake.  But that mistake will not be undone by today’s 
opinion. 
Without a finding of deterrence, application of the 
exclusionary rule carries substantial costs: 
Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the 
judicial system and society at large.  It almost 
always requires courts to ignore reliable, 
trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or 
innocence.  And its bottom-line effect, in many 
cases, is to suppress the truth and set the 
criminal loose in the community without 
punishment. 
Davis, 546 U.S. ---, slip op at 7 (citations omitted).  For all of 
these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
